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  Monique Roelofs
Abstract
Aesthetics, race, and nation are densely imbricated with one another. This essay
examines their interactions in a newspaper column that describes an aesthetic
confrontation between a presumably Arab taxi driver and his passenger, a white
European-Dutch columnist. In this column, taste engenders acts of identification and
abjection, transmits projections of fear, and underwrites a division of labor and virtue.
It thereby serves as a racial border patrolling technology and institutes racial
boundaries. To clarify the racial power of aesthetic constellations in the taxicab case,
the paper turns to the dualities and integrations that theorists such as Addison,
Baumgarten, Schiller, and Hegel have historically located at the center of their
conceptions of the aesthetic. Unwrapping the disciplinary operations sustained in the
taxi scenario by differentially available separations and integrations between mind and
body, public and private, individuality and sociality, the essay investigates what follows
for an understanding of aesthetic disciplinarity.
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1. Introduction
Aesthetic performances of race inhere in the common run of things. The aesthetic wiring
of everyday existence propagates the racial being of social subjects.[1] In the following,
I show the aesthetic at work in its racializing operations in the column, “Taxi Ride,”
written by the Dutch writer Martin Bril for De Volkskrant, a left-of-center national
newspaper in the Netherlands in December 2004.[2] The column implicitly envisions an
aesthetic delineation of cultural citizenship. Aesthetic modalities thereby serve as
technologies of race. This raises questions about the nature of aesthetic disciplinarity.
How does it take effect? What are its conceptual preconditions? What kinds of labor
does it enlist? With an eye on historical constructions of the aesthetic, this essay
examines how the taxicab case can advance our understanding of such disciplinarity.
2. An Aesthetic Clash
“Taxi Ride” is the story of an aesthetic confrontation between the autochthonous, white
Dutch writer Martin Bril and his possibly Arab, Dutch-speaking taxi driver, as described
by the author. On a Saturday evening, Bril has to go somewhere and hails a cab in the
streets of Amsterdam. An old VW Jetta stops. He instantly regrets his decision but
continues as planned. A hot cloud slams into his body when he enters the car. It smells
of toilet cleaner. What he calls “loud Arabic whiny music” is playing on the radio
(“Arabische jammermuziek”). A plastic sheet covers the back seat to protect it against
puking passengers. Everything in the car rattles. The driver speeds and takes a detour.
“We arrived at an intersection where we had to go straight, yes, I know my city. But the
driver took a left. . . . With lightening speed we approached the next intersection, and I
assumed we were going to take a right. We stormed straight-on.” At this moment, Bril
protests. When the driver turns around to answer his passenger’s objection, the car
zigzags. In “virtually accentless” Dutch, which the writer finds hard to square with the
whiny music, the driver replies, “This is fastest, or do you want to walk?” Bril doesn’t
want to. He notes he is being tremendously screwed. “On the other hand,” he remarks,
“it was also a beautiful feat of free-market policy.” He asks if the heat can be turned
down. “‘It feels good here!’ the driver shouts, ‘or do you want to walk?’” Reluctant to
walk, Bril keeps silent for the rest of the ride. The column concludes with the following
observation: “I looked out of the window, and my own city appeared to me strange and
uncanny. The music offered no other point of connection than vague memories of other
metropolises I had roamed by taxicab at an ungodly hour: Paris, New York, Athens. I

felt like a stranger--duped and fucked over.”
3. Aesthetic Collectivity, Racial Abjection, and the Figure of Damaged Aesthetic
Experience
Bril’s investment in the aesthetic qualities of a proper taxi trip and his distaste for the
sensory affronts committed by the driver differentiate a zone of aesthetically legitimate
conduct from an abject realm of aesthetic undesirability. Aesthetic experience, in the
column, distinguishes Amsterdam as it is known and loved from the city it has become
(or is at risk of becoming) under the influence of a disagreeable sensibility. Through the
pejorative reference to the music, the text codes the latter style negatively as culturally
different and, more specifically, as Arab.
Bril’s aesthetic, as it appears in the text, embodies the position I call “racialized
aesthetic nationalism.”[3] This stance enlists aesthetic interpretations and experiences
in the service of nationalist and racist attitudes. The column articulates a variety of
racialized aesthetic nationalism that expects to be able to organize the environment in
accordance with its own taste. This sensibility recognizes “my city” as my city insofar as
it is arranged in conformity with my aesthetic norms. I am entitled to feel at home in
my own, Dutch way. I thereby acknowledge a single Dutch style of being Dutch, namely
my style, which I share with those who I take to have been civilized in accordance with
my norms, values, and traditions. The city should have a distinctive cultural character
in that it observes stylistic criteria that have been set by white, autochthonous
inhabitants or, in any event, a representative, authentic subgroup of them. Such
citizens ought to be able to experience the city as their cultural property. Amsterdam is
expected to exude a phenomenal feel that these individuals can experience as
recognizably “theirs.” They must be capable of joining one another in an affiliation with
the city that sustains the sense of being congregated in what counts as “our” habitat.
An aesthetic vision along these lines implicitly posits racial and nationalist norms. It
aspires to an aesthetic organization of culture that supports racialized identities and
nationalist longings.
Bril’s article shows how a racial, nationalist aesthetic can organize experience around an
aesthetically inflected sense of cultural ownership, violation, and strangeness. Aesthetic
norms and scripts thereby regulate states of racial desire and acts of abjection that
engender identificatory positions. Monitoring flows of affiliation and disavowal,
judgments of taste line up the furrows of the racial community to establish a
distribution of virtue and labor. Aestheticization converges with racialization.
In the cab, the city becomes strange to Bril in a way other cities are normally,
appropriately strange. But Amsterdam does not thereby become strange in an ordinary
way. It turns strangely strange.[4] The strangeness that in other cities can be an object
of desire, in Amsterdam is difficult to take. The city acquires a foreign character that
dislodges Bril from his customary aesthetic inhabitation of the environment. His
identificatory feeling of affinity that makes Amsterdam “my city” is disrupted.
Strangeness infuses the familiar. Because the strange uncannily approximates the
ordinary, it appears even stranger: the conjunction of “Arabic whiny” music with a
virtually accentless language, ostensibly hard to distinguish from the autochthonously
Dutch, presents a conundrum for Bril. Immersed in strange strangeness, the author
becomes a stranger to himself, a person who feels “like a foreigner” in his own town.
Indeed, Bril is in danger of being thrown out of the taxicab (“Do you want to walk?”).
The driver mediates his access to the city. He is in charge of Bril’s mobility. The
possibilities of the evening are in his hands. An aesthetic script typical of a taxi ride
stipulates that the chauffeur should provide a perspective from which the passenger can
imagine witnessing a city, a country, a culture. His designated role is that of a liaison
with the environment, as when a cab driver supplies reporters or tourists with materials
for informal ethnographic studies. In such a scenario, the ride enhances the consumer’s
grip on his surroundings, expanding his vision and broadening his cultural repertoire.
Bril’s driver violates this aesthetic contract. He refuses to adjust his comportment to the
representational demands of his job. Whereas he is to facilitate the writer’s freedom of
motion, he in fact restricts it, controlling the aesthetic parameters of the situation. This

role could be a source of delight if assisted by the requisite cultural cachet. As it
happens, however, the driver’s choices receive a negative racial valence in Bril’s
estimation and fail to be to his liking. These two assessments by Bril are one of a kind.
The racialization legitimates the dislike. The lack of aesthetic appreciation underlies the
racialization. Aesthetics and racialization conspire together. Consequently, a freedom of
the ethnic worker in the recently deregulated taxi market[5] is imagined to prevail over
a freedom of the white consumer at the cost of the latter’s aesthetic pleasure and racial
sense of belonging. A racialized aesthetic offense has occurred, which amounts at the
same time to an aestheticized racial infraction, a limitation of the racial and aesthetic
power to align life’s details with white European desires.
The driver appropriates another privilege that a racialized, nationalist aesthetic counts
among the entitlements of the white cultural connoisseur. The authority to adjudicate
what qualifies as normal and deviant shifts from the writer to the driver. Judgments of
aesthetic appropriateness fall under the driver’s jurisdiction. Taste-setting power is
wrenched away from Bril. The driver is in the know about the right way to go and the
correct level of climate control: “This is fastest!” “It feels good here.” In writing the
column, Bril reclaims the aesthetic authority that was withheld from him in the car. The
aesthetic experiences and judgments he describes in the text express a sensory
knowledge of cultural identity and difference.
Locating the taxi ride in racial territory, the designation ‘Arabic whiny music’ and the
reference to the hot temperature rhetorically make plausible Bril’s feelings of
strangeness. They appear to justify his comparison with other cities and to account for
the temporal and spatial shift from an ordinary Saturday evening to a nobody’s land
where, in the dead of night, anything can happen. The racialization of the music
transfers to the other senses, the imposture, and the urban environment. Taste
implements racial boundaries and serves as a racial border-patrolling technology.
Bril casts a racially-coded aesthetic confrontation and the broader political themes it
reflects in language that speaks to the reader’s affects. Cultural difference becomes
tangible as aesthetically inflected foreignness and unseemliness, an ethnically tagged
refusal to play by everyday aesthetic rules. More generally, while questions of
immigration and community owe their reality in part to things like laws, rights, treaties,
work permits, and passports, our persuasions about these matters simultaneously spin
through the wheels of aesthetic interpretation and desire. We tailor ourselves to
aesthetic models of identification and disidentification in which we are invested. Under
modernity, identity, difference, and conflict are wriggled into shape as aesthetic
products and processes. Bril’s expression of alienation reveals that his sense of self and
otherness demands aesthetic sustenance. The presumptive aesthetic defects of the taxi
and its driver undercut the possibility of aesthetic identification for the writer.
Conversely, we can assume that his failure to identify with the music and the
temperature contributes to his more general perception of aesthetic impropriety. Absent
the “Arab” music and the heat, the fast speed might have appeared exciting to him,
perhaps efficient; the detour might have morphed into an expansive, bird’s eye
conception of the town; possibly the plastic and the old, rattling car could have seemed
to punctuate Amsterdam’s customary orderliness with a slight, enticing grunginess.
As it is, Bril’s aesthetic affiliation with his environment has been disturbed. His being
duped draws its affective meaning from the disruption of a proprietary cultural
sensibility. The rip-off, in turn, loads the aesthetic arrangement to which he was
exposed with the weight of moral wrongdoing. The estrangement between him and “his
city,” the city he knows intimately, signals the effects of an aesthetic and ethical
maladjustment. The racial subject demands an adequately racialized organization of his
surroundings, and this depends on the right kinds of aesthetic conditions. Racialized and
nationalist aesthetic wishes, readings, and habits underlie our sense of who we are and
are not. They are responsible for a sense of place.
Vis-à-vis the reader, the column reasserts the distinction between proper and improper
taste that has been breached in the cab. The article juxtaposes an apparently correct
Dutch style, which is understood to stand in need of protection, and a foreign mode of
conduct that is perceived to threaten European-Dutch accomplishments. Bril proposes a

racialized polarity of social and aesthetic virtues and flaws: via the musical signifier and
the lost sense of aesthetic ownership, admirable traits such as sensory delightfulness,
honesty, reliability, and elegance are implicitly contrasted with problematic
characteristics such as sensory overbearingness, asocial behavior, incompetence if not
criminality, incorrigibility, a lack of responsiveness. The honorable attributes are
comprehended as authentically Dutch, while the disagreeable ones connote a culturally
different, possibly Arab background.
In short, “Taxi Ride” negotiates racial power on aesthetic terrain. The text offers an
articulation of what counts as an adequately Dutch mode of social comportment, which
it attributes to a white, autochthonous public intellectual, and formulates a conception
of a problematic moral and stylistic habitus, which it associates with a presumably
allochthonous, probably Arab worker in a relatively low-status service position. The
column traces how the true Dutch way of being is unjustifiably and inexplicably violated
by foreign behaviors.[6] It outlines a position of victimhood with which it invites the
reader to identify. The public is solicited to experience indignation and concern about
an ethnically coded aesthetic misdemeanor, and about the threat such transgressions
pose for the cultural good. White racial anxieties, less than two months after filmmaker
Theo van Gogh’s murder by the Moroccan-Dutch Muslim activist Mohammed Bouyeri in
the streets of the Dutch capital, could reasonably be counted upon to recruit feelings of
unease on the part of the reader in defense of human accomplishments construed in
terms of the city’s authentically Dutch character (social grace, good form) and in
opposition to dangers characterized as alien and Arab (rudeness, deceit, bad form). The
designation “Arabic whiny-music” facilitates the projection of fear onto a supposed
aesthetic danger, which then legitimates the felt threat.[7] Its allusion to the presence
of Arabs in the country supplies an object for generalized feelings of cultural unease,
the sense that one’s own city, style and culture are under siege. The reader is invited to
empathize with Bril’s victimhood, and to respond with moral and aesthetic disapproval
to the lot that befell the author that Saturday evening in Amsterdam, which the reader
knows could have been hers on any evening, in any town in the Netherlands. Offering
the public an object for racial and aesthetic repulsion, the text goes some way toward
restoring the demands of taste on which the driver had infringed.
It is worth briefly further unpacking the nomenclature “Arabic whiny music.” The
conjunction of an ethnic designation (“Arabic”) with an aesthetic marker (“whiny”)
creates the impression that Bril is informing us of his engagement with a certain
cultural entity, a genre of music. The label is suggestive of a connection between
“Arabic music” and “music that whines,” insinuating, for example, that “Arabic music”
typically whines and is distasteful in that regard, or that among the varieties of whiny
kinds of music there is this type, “Arabic whiny music” that whines in its own Arabic
fashion and is aesthetically objectionable in that sense. Ontologies of this sort, however,
are a reflection of the aesthetic resistance of the listener, not of the nature of a
category of music playing on the radio. Note the simplification inherent in the label
“Arab.” Is it folk music, religious music, court music, classical music, Egyptian,
Moroccan or Lebanese pop-music that is playing in the cab? The denomination “Arabic
music” tells us little about the sound that was actually heard. The notion “whiny,”
likewise, says more about the perceiver’s undifferentiated experience of the sound and
his dislike for this sound, than about the music itself. There is no category “Arabic
whiny music,” apart from the music that a listener for some reason experiences as both
Arab and whiny, or as whiny in what seems like some typically Arab way, presumably
on account of its microtonal intervals.
Bril’s description of the sound indicates that the specific qualities of the music he hears
make no appeal to his listening capacities. The cause of this, his vocabulary suggests,
lies with the sound itself: being “Arabic whiny music,” it just happens to be the sort of
unpleasant music you want to avoid if you can. But this linguistic construction effaces
the part played by his distaste for the sound, which is projected onto the object of
aesthetic aversion. Bril’s musical designation achieves a rhetorical legitimization of his
undifferentiated musical experience. The driver’s musical choice makes no demand on
the columnist’s understanding. By attributing the reason for this to the reprehensible
music and the driver’s diminished aesthetic judgment, Bril’s terminology lends him

reprieve from a type of work. His language implies that he doesn’t have to perform the
labor of comprehension. There is no real need for such labor; the job is easy, obvious:
one hears, feels and knows. Should a more serious expenditure of labor be required, it
isn’t worth the effort. Either way, Bril doesn’t have to toil to get his aesthetic desires
fulfilled in the cab. It is the driver’s task to satisfy these wishes. He bears the
responsibility to supply an adequate aesthetic environment; to the extent that he
doesn’t, the fault lies with him and his aesthetic demeanor, perhaps his cultural
background.
Excusing Bril from a particular kind of aesthetic labor, his auditory experience includes
an aesthetic disaffiliation from the sounds he listens to. In hearing the music, he is
moved to ward it off. His aural disengagement not only limits his encounter with the
sounds, but also keeps at bay the meanings and values encoded in these sounds and
blocks the symbol systems that materialize in them. These elements fail to lay a claim
on his understanding or regard.
It is not that Bril declines to work. In the taxicab and in writing the column, he
undertakes the work of abjection and boundary patrolling. Aesthetic experience in the
cab, as I have indicated, carries out part of this work; the setting aright of taste in the
column accomplishes another part of it. The writer shows a preference for one form of
work over another: the disciplinary labor he executes in the form of aesthetic activity
justifies his not having to work in the area of aesthetic perception and understanding.
Bril’s musical designation would not be able to aspire to the rhetorical effects I have
just described in the case of mainstream European or Anglo-American musics. The
negative judgment would reflect on the perceiver rather than the perceived. Were the
musical label associated with aesthetic forms that enjoy a high level of social
recognition, popularity, or respect, the vacuity of the relevant classification would
instantly be revealed. The limitations of Bril’s musical taste would clamor resoundingly.
It would be unlikely that the text could get its readership interested in, let alone worried
about the aesthetic breakdown epitomized by the driver. The reader would distance
her- or himself from the text’s celebration of aesthetic insularity; the wistful affirmation
on the part of this reader, “yes, that’s the way it is, these days,” would be withheld.[8]
Love or esteem for some form of “Arabic” music is likely to hinder an empathetic
pursuit of the affective trajectory traced by the column. The article’s aesthetic success
requires that the public can go along in the author’s undifferentiated attitude vis-à-vis
the object of his musical dislike. The text posits an audience that is ready to be moved
by a racialized aesthetically nationalist perspective.
Through abjection--the racially coded disowning of the driver’s supposedly repulsive
comportment--the column distinguishes the aesthetic of the racial, national self from an
aesthetic connoted pejoratively as other. Such otherness (the cab’s, the driver’s, and
the city’s difference from the norm) acquires its contours by contrast with the aesthetic
codes that mark the favored, Dutch stylistic habitus. Construing racially marked,
aesthetically condemnable behaviors and states of affairs as external to the realm of
proper citizenship, and holding them responsible for an abridgment of culture, the text
imagines a cultural zone that is to be safeguarded. The article calls on the reader to
support his cultural property in defense of his sense of aesthetic belonging and his
ability to feel at home in town. The suggestion is that it is worthwhile to stand up for
these historical achievements.
One might object that the column merely verbalizes Bril’s reactions to the driver’s
aesthetic and ethical misbehavior, neutrally presenting them to the public for reflection.
Such a minimalist interpretation, however, misses the participation of antecedent racial
constellations in the production of textual form and effect. The column implicitly
identifies the city’s failure to mirror a fantasy of monoethnically acculturated
subjectivity to the passenger as a source of white upper/middle class alienation. It
takes no steps to contest the aesthetic and racial preconditions for this feeling. Instead
it articulates dismay about the supposed evacuation of white indigenous cultural
proprietorship. In the post 9/11 era of increased white racial fear and deepened cultural
surveillance, this feeling, unqualified by attempts to complicate or foreclose the
readership’s empathetic response, carries expansive cultural meanings. These cannot be

bracketed from the text per se as the minimalist reading would have it. The column
actively polices aesthetic ownership over the city and solicits the audience’s imaginative
and affective participation in this project. The reader may feel encouraged to take up
this work of cultural maintenance, or feel strengthened in her resolve to undertake it.
Bril’s text illustrates how a racialized, aesthetically nationalist outlook can give rise to
an ethnocentric construal of the hometown. Negatively racialized readings of aesthetic
elements, represented by the column, may authorize subjects to close themselves off
from objects, forms, individuals, collectivities, and significatory systems that are taken
to elude the favored conception of culture. Tyrannized by racial intrusions, aesthetic
experience can function as an invitation to seal up the cultural field. The newspaper
column produces what we may call the figure of “damaged aesthetic experience,” that
is, the trope of a desirable aesthetic experience that could reasonably have been
expected to take place but was prevented from occurring due to somebody’s (in this
case the driver’s) destructive action, or to some harmful condition that came in the way
(in the present case, the racial chaos attributed to the contemporary multicultural city).
Because this figure can nurse the need to replenish the lost aesthetic flourishing it
animates and deplores, it can command a narrowing of one’s cultural vision--the
aesthetic withdrawal already mentioned, the tendency to seek aesthetic shelter in one’s
own stylistic confines. The evocation of an aesthetic lack is able to inspire a contraction
of the aesthetic community, whether melancholically, through imaginary restoration, or
in an activist spirit. It can fuel a diminishment of the shared aesthetic life world, within
and beyond the limits of the collective.[9]
My reading so far has shown that Bril’s column puts forth a racialized aesthetically
nationalist position by featuring a musical experience that takes a racial twist, and by
staging a disruption of aesthetic experience and agency. I have indicated how aesthetic
norms can rally feelings, desires, and acts of abjection in support of racial bonds and
scissions. The identifications that this involves mandate certain kinds of aesthetic work
and virtuous action (the writer’s and the reader’s cultural labor; the driver’s self
regulation in accordance with the city’s presumed standard of taste). The concomitant
disidentifications honor a type of non-work (the writer’s withholding of comprehension),
while also denouncing dimensions of aesthetic agency that are embodied in a type of
work (the driver’s deviation from communal standards of taste in the process of
carrying out his job).
4. Aesthetic Integrationsm: Addison, Baumgarten, Schiller, Hegel
Aesthetic disciplinarity takes a further form in Bril’s column and the encounter it
describes. This stands out if we consider the Dutch taxicab case from the perspective of
the history of aesthetics. In the theories of foundational writers in the field, such as
Joseph Addison, Alexander Baumgarten, Friedrich Schiller, and G.W.F. Hegel, aesthetic
experience occupies a middle ground between the dualities of mind and body and
related oppositions.[10] These thinkers have defended what I will call an
“integrationist” view of aesthetic experience. Combining reason and affect, sensation
and imagination, public and private, and individual and society, the aesthetic in their
accounts conjoins polarities philosophy has typically distinguished from one another.
Thereby the aesthetic can be seen to both observe and resist hierarchical normative
codings that have historically been inscribed in these binaries. I will briefly illustrate this
point in the case of each theorist.[11]
Joseph Addison develops a conception of aesthetic experience by tracing parallels and
differences with the senses and the understanding. He considers aesthetic
contemplation or, more precisely, the “Pleasures of the Imagination” “not as gross as
those of Sense, nor so refined as those of the Understanding.”[12] Furthermore, like
our cognitive pleasures and unlike our “more sensual Delights,” the pleasures of the
imagination, in his view, don’t give rise to negligence, sloth, and idleness. However, like
sensory pleasure and unlike the pleasures of the understanding they don’t require labor
or entail difficulty. Being more conducive to work than the senses and less demanding
of it than the understanding, in his theory the pleasures of the imagination have a
favorable influence on mind, body, and the state of our emotions.[13] Yet he considers
the imagination not as compendious as the understanding. This defect, he suggests,

may not be due to the soul, which harbors the faculty of taste, but to the association of
the imagination with the body.[14] Addison thus holds parallels and differences with the
senses and the understanding responsible for various benefits and disadvantages that
he takes to accrue to aesthetic experience.[15]
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten defines aesthetics as the science of sensory cognition,
aimed at perfecting it.[16] Comprehended as a sensory form of cognition, the aesthetic
participates in reason as well as sensation and would seem to bridge the divide that
separates these functions. Nevertheless, Baumgarten’s theory replicates traditional
distinctions between mind and body and reason and sensation. Writing in the rationalist
tradition of Leibniz and Christian Wolff, he understands sensory cognition as a lower
cognitive faculty that is to be governed by the higher faculties of understanding and
reason.[17] While narrowing, interrupting, and dislodging the divide between sensation
and cognition, Baumgarten’s account of the proper aesthetic functioning of the lower
and higher faculties simultaneously affirms hierarchies between mind and body, and
reason and sensation.
For Schiller, the aesthetic reconciles mind and body, reason and emotion, imagination
and sensation or perception, individual and society, and private and public. The socalled play drive allows for the development of rationality and morality by integrating
reason with sensation and affect.[18] It thereby overcomes the fragmentation and
specialization with which humans have had to pay for the development of learning and
civilization.[19] According to Schiller, the modern individual inhabits the state like “an
ingenious clockwork, in which, out of piecing together innumerable but lifeless parts, a
mechanical kind of collective life ensued.”[20] Harmonizing the subject’s sensuous and
spiritual faculties, taste restores the integrity of the individual as well as that of larger
society.[21] Beauty grants human beings a social character, which is conducive to their
harmonious co-existence. Under the influence of the aesthetic, Schiller concludes,
“society becomes united by relating to what is common to all” and can be made
“real.”[22] By integrating over time a set of interconnected polarities, aesthetic activity,
accordingly, is capable of accomplishing an emancipatory path of social and political
development.[23]
Even if Schiller accords the rational and the sensuous drive each a necessary role in the
development of the individual and the collective, a development that is to culminate in
the realization of our full humanity, he ultimately ranks the sphere of reason above the
realm of imagination, emotion, sensation, and matter. In his view, the “war against
Matter” is to be played in “the very territory of Matter itself.”[24] The sensuous domain,
for him, connotes capriciousness and formlessness.[25] Rejecting an overemphasis on
rationality (which betrays “barbarism”) as well as the dominance of sensuousness or
“brute Nature” (which entails “savagery” and the “primitive”), he associates the latter
with initial strata of development, whereas he links the former with a more advanced
stage of civilization.[26] Materiality is to be distanced by a pure, autonomous aesthetic
on the part of artists as well as observers.[27] Schiller’s aesthetics privileges the
domain of reason over that of the sensuous.
Metaphysical differences with the aforementioned theorists notwithstanding, Hegel
shares with these thinkers a view of aesthetic experience that positions such experience
between rationality and sensation. In his account, art constitutes the sensuous
appearance of the idea. Charged with the task of displaying the highest reality
sensuously, art must bring to expression the deepest and most comprehensive truths of
the spirit.[28] So conceived, artworks constitute a “reconciling middle term” between
pure thought and the sensuous.[29] Furthermore, according to Hegel, artworks aim to
achieve a unity between spirit and the senses and feelings. In other words, the artist is
to harmonize spiritual content with sensory form.[30] He believes that classical art,
that is to say, the art of the ancient Greek epoch, had indeed achieved this harmony.
Despite the significance Hegel accords the senses, the superiority of rationality is a
prominent tenet of his system. Reason’s preeminence is exemplified, among other
things, in the higher place art occupies in the metaphysical order, compared to the
mere sensory appearance of things, due to art’s participation in spirit.[31] The
superiority of reason can also be witnessed in the subordination of art’s sensuous

shape, that is to say, its material aspect, which originates in nature, to its spiritual
dimension.[32] In addition to this, reason’s supremacy manifests itself in the
restrictions art’s sensuous commitments impose on the representation of spirituality,
which during the romantic era, that is to say the period in which spirit advances to its
most selfconscious stage, cause art’s prominence in expressing the deepest spiritual
interests to be supplanted by philosophy. [33] Hegel’s account of the artistic
reconciliation of rationality with sensation and feeling thus clearly preserves a
hierarchical ordering of these elements.
Whereas rationality, sensation, embodiment, and affect acquire different definitions in
Addison, Baumgarten, Schiller, and Hegel, these four theorists render normatively
coded oppositions and integrations between these functions central to their
understanding of aesthetic activity. For each philosopher, aesthetic experience derives
distinctive capabilities and limitations from its participation in these polarities.
5. Dualities and Integrations as Disciplinary Forces
Returning to Bril, we can see that the oppositions and integrations that Addison,
Baumgarten, Schiller, and Hegel locate at the heart of their conceptions of the aesthetic
perform a disciplinary function in the cab and the column. These dualities and
syntheses accord the aesthetic with an all-embracing scope. They make available
multidimensional vectors of power that can be put to work toward the production of
racial delineations.
Racialization, in “Taxi Ride,” is carried by several senses (hearing, smelling, touching,
vision, thermoception, proprioception). It rushes along the pathways of various affects
(irritation, repulsion, fear). These emotions include perceptions, imaginings, reasonings,
and desires concerning the temporality of the journey and the vehicle’s motion through
urban space. These feelings also keep pace with states of bodily proximity, exposure,
vulnerability, mobility, and stasis (driver and passenger are stuck together in a
contained space for the duration of the ride).
The simultaneously public setting and private enclosure of the taxi activates general
norms that govern a meeting between strangers. At the same time this liminal site calls
for individualized scripts by way of which the participants in the encounter generate an
exchange that remains in some respects indifferent to the specific propensities of
concrete persons. The radio, for instance, reveals this doubleness. On the one hand, the
radio in a cab is a type, a classical part of the taxi environment and image, a standard
thing for the driver and the passenger to contend with, to take delight in, or to ignore,
as the case may be. On the other hand, the radio represents an object of intense
personal attachment--people often have strong feelings about the kinds of music they
hear. Accordingly, the taxi combines public and private elements, opening up a space
where tensions and alignments between these spheres must be juggled. This
conjunction and negotiation obtains also in the forum of the newspaper column, which,
pitched in an autobiographical voice, offers up a personal anecdote for reception by the
paper’s readership at large.
Bril puts together an extensive, normatively charged array of elements to achieve a
racial organization of individual and social space and time. He implements racial
demarcations by way of aesthetic codes that regulate the movement of people through
space; the deployment of vehicles, radios, and household materials; and the driverpassenger relation. Racial delineations are anchored in the structuring of time and in the
environment. Racialization in the cab finds expression in a network of bodily conditions,
physical objects, social roles, psychic functions, and phenomenal states. As a
technology of race, the aesthetic has at its disposal multidimensional registers of
embodied relationships and encounters that shape our being-in-the-world. The
conjunction of what have often been considered separate spheres of existence endows
racializing aesthetic activity with a comprehensive range of significatory modalities.
Enlightenment dualities and their aesthetic integrations perform another disciplinary
function in “Taxi Ride.” They give rise to racial effects that reproduce hierarchies with
which these oppositions have traditionally been imbued. A pattern of divisions as well

as collaborations between reason and the realm of affect, materiality, and embodiment,
between the public and the private, and the individual and the social structure the
column’s disciplinary workings. The text associates the uncommunicative, apparently
allochthonous driver with the material and affective side of existence, and the
passenger with the more rational aspect. While the driver answers polite requests by
way of dirty looks and threats, Bril remains on top of his feelings. The columnist lays
out the events calmly. He arrives at interpretations of the sensory dimensions of the
encounter, offering inferences, hypotheses, and judgments as to the point of things. He
is a source of ethical and aesthetic assessments as to the way a journey ought to go.
He engages in deliberation about his own actions, reactions, wishes and feelings, and
puts forth reflections concerning the driver’s behavior. Conclusions are reached.
Meanwhile, Bril gets to give the driver a dirty look. As noted before, the column
recounts how the driver challenges his client’s aesthetic sensibilities on multiple fronts-he is taken along at high speeds in an old, rattling vehicle, seated on plastic, subjected
to tropical temperatures, barraged by loud, unpleasant music, and bathed in the smell
of toilet cleaner. In addition to this, Bril remarks that the driver presents a body that, in
his words, “looks bad,” displaying a face marked by “thick lines under the eyes, a
stubble chin, baggy eyes, a mouth that was grinding chewing gum.”[34] Empowered by
his command over the stylistic norms of public life in the forum of the newspaper, the
sensible Dutch man of taste publicly airs the dirty look he casts under the cover of
equable, evenhanded rationality.
In the spirit of the reasonable, furthermore, Bril makes a whiney lament, nostalgically
deploring the injury inflicted on his home territory. Yet his unruly sensibilities neatly
fold into a levelheaded exposition. His feelings do not disrupt the composure of his
tone. While the medium of a newspaper column enables the author’s anecdote to
transcend the moment of the personal incident, the driver, who fails to observe the
rules of public life, remains situated in the private sphere of the body and its material
trappings. Speaking in a public voice, Bril hears the music as the driver’s music,
steeped in ethnic difference, and implicitly witnesses here the racially uncontrolled
overflowing of aesthetic alterity onto the urban landscape.
The sociality of musical preferences consists partly in the fact that musical affiliations
involve a dimension of imagined and desired companionship with like-minded audiences
and a distance from those whose tastes take different directions. This does not entail
something as drastic as that if you condemn someone’s music you thereby necessarily
insult that individual’s personhood or his social being, but it does mean that an
ethnically coded musical dislike is not altogether independent of a musically coded racial
aversion. I have already mentioned the intertwining of these feelings. What concerns
me here is the more general point that the ethnic classification and the aesthetic
resistance captured in the label “Arabic whiny music,” together with the alienation
expressed by Bril, evoke racialized social dimensions of musical life. It is in virtue of the
confluence of individual and social registers of meaning in aesthetic experience and
judgment that the text posits a contrast between Dutch and Arab aesthetic
companionship and bonding, whereby the latter comes to signify a racial danger the
article warns the reader against. The sociality of individual aesthetic preferences
partially underwrites the text’s racializing force. Individual aesthetic sentiments, within
the medium of the newspaper column, capture broader racialized social structures. The
convergence of individuality and sociality functions as a source of aesthetic power.[35]
In the cracks between rationality and sensuous embodiment, individuality and sociality,
and the private and the public, the column replicates traditional pejorative connotations
of materiality as uncivilized, unruly, crude, gross, formless, and restrictive, and
reinstitutes honorific connotations of rationality in terms of understanding, knowledge,
civilization, morality, and truth. The column personifies these differences in the figures
of the driver and the passenger. Historical integrations and dualities underwrite a
specific disciplinary logic that spans the encounter in the cab and the story in the paper.
The conjunction of differentially available registers of publicity and privacy, sociality and
individuality, rationality and affectivity or embodied being underlies the column’s racial
workings.

If the driver makes a detour, the passenger takes a shortcut. I have suggested that the
figure of damaged aesthetic experience offers the reader an object for the projection of
anxieties and aversions that stem from racializing and nationalist sensibilities. It locks
into emotions and desires that are able to call forth a white defensive cultural posture
without needing to offer a convincing reason or to elaborate much of a story that would
warrant a sense of endangerment. It suffices to show how the sensory malfunctions
sustained by an apparently autochthonous aesthetic reprobate infract upon the
achievement of everyday Dutch cultural respectability. The sense impressions described
in the column short-circuit deliberative rationality and narrative detail. Mobilizing rich
cultural meanings by addressing a wide spectrum of human functions, Bril’s aesthetic
judgments catalyze a web of incipient ideas, reasons, imaginings, and feelings. Taste
and distaste perform a racializing function against the backdrop of a racial, nationalist
aesthetic that shapes the reader’s experience without having to be spelled out.
In virtue of the multidimensional resonance of the aesthetic, the figure of damaged
aesthetic experience condenses the requisite evidential and affective work.[36] This
effect would be undercut by further expository detail. Given the encapsulating force of
aesthetic experience, the column puts into gear a full-blown racial apparatus while
touching the theme of race fleetingly, so lightly that the column may not even seem to
concern race. On the surface, it may just appear to call into question some minor
aesthetic annoyances. However, the encompassing scope of aesthetic experience
underwrites the racial power of the threat of aesthetic degeneracy, implementing social
hierarchies in an expansive, densely knotted web of interlacing cultural functions. Here
we encounter again the all-embracing reach of the aesthetic, which, in collaboration
with the tendency of the aesthetic to replicate categorially entrenched forms of
domination, must be counted among its disciplinary powers.
Aesthetic experience fulfills yet another disciplinary role in Bril’s case. This function
draws upon Baumgarten’s conception of the aesthetic as a sensory form of knowledge
and Hegel’s notion of the sensory embodiment of ideas. I have shown how the sensory
encounter between the driver, the passenger, and the vehicle (sound, touch, vision,
smell, heat, motion) exemplifies the perceived erosion of autochthonous aesthetic
governance over the city space under the influence of working class immigrant labor.
The column invites us to examine the bodily interaction in the cab as an instance of the
shifting cultural character of the city. This encounter yields knowledge of a racial
change that the text conveys to the reader. Following Baumgarten, we can recognize
here the construction of a sensory form of cognition of contemporary race relations. In
Hegelian terms, we can speak of a sensory embodiment of ideas pertaining to racial
selves and others. Sensory knowing or ideation is fundamental to the workings of the
aesthetic as a racial discipline in the cab and the column. The text enables the reader
to experience cultural difference as aesthetic inappropriateness. I have argued that this
experience contains a disaffiliation from racial otherness in the form of aesthetic
distaste. In this experience, the aesthetically desirable self is distinguished from the
aesthetically repulsive other, and feels provoked to distance itself. Via aesthetic
aversion, sensory social and environmental knowledge of racial constellations aligns
affect against racial otherness. The text’s racial force can partially be attributed to its
production of a form of sensory knowledge.
Sensory understanding thereby functions not merely as a content of experience but also
as a technology for the creation of experience. Bril implicitly notes that the ordinary
production of sensory knowledge has gone awry in the taxicab. He witnesses an
unsettling misappropriation of means of knowledge formation. His voice is no match for
the racket generated by the loud radio and the rattling car. Whiny noise invades the
soundscape, banishing familiar taxi songs and city sounds. The car itself is an old VW
Jetta rather than a newish Mercedes. Domestic items such as the smell of toilet cleaner
and the look and the feel of the plastic on the back seat eradicate what could have been
appealing olfactory, visual, and tactile images. Blurring a transparent, audible
distinction between self and other, virtually accentless Dutch takes over an auditory
space that in the usual course of things would be filled by an indigenously Dutch
inflection or, for that matter, perhaps by an identifiably and intriguingly foreignsounding tongue.

Aesthetics, communication devices, domestic technology, and language collaboratively
shift the space from the familiar settings of legible Dutch identity (“yes, I know my
city”) to the anonymity of what might as well have been any Western metropolitan
environment. The passenger’s sensory modes of cognition are thrown into disarray.
Sensations fail to embody received ideas. While it may be acceptable that in certain
cities anything can happen, that one can’t reliably make out the meanings of the signals
one encounters, or finds one’s cultural knowledge to be of diminished applicability, this
is a problem if it occurs in one’s own city. In the cab, Bril’s modes of knowledge
production do not authoritatively determine how things are or should be done; his
stylistic judgment and his special relation to the city lack prescriptive aesthetic power.
His ordinary means of making sensory cognition meaningful and of taking pleasure in
the sensory embodiment of ideas lose their reliability.
The column cautions us against this breakdown of technologies of aesthetic
understanding. Sensory and cognitive unsettlement culminates in moral disorder. Bril’s
trust has been betrayed: “I protested. To be honest, this is not my forte. I just always
want to go by the idea that people have the best intentions for me. I know it’s a dumb
viewpoint, but occasionally advantages cling to it, though they don’t come to mind
readily now.” The driver’s actions have ruffled a framework of social virtue that no
longer knows its own innocence. A racialized aesthetic affront has swelled into epistemic
and moral destabilization, the origin of which is attributed to the taxi driver. Turmoil
has taken over the customary sensory embodiment of ideas. “Our” ordinary modes of
sensory knowledge production are in uproar. The column diagnoses this commotion as a
racial problem.
6. Theorizing Aesthetic Disciplinarity
My investigation of the disciplinary functioning of aesthetic integrations and dualities in
the Dutch taxi scenario has several implications for an understanding of aesthetic
disciplinarity, which I briefly describe in this section. Cultural theorists and philosophers
have argued that mind-body dichotomies and related oppositions often carry social
connotations.[37] One pole represents the norm; the other signifies deviancy. For this
reason the dualities underwriting the aesthetic field can be expected to impart
hierarchical differences to our cultural encounters, and to make possible forms of
oppression. Indeed, Naomi Schor links the functioning of mind-body separations in
aesthetics with distinctions between genders and classes.[38] Frantz Fanon has
explored the participation of the mind-body division in a partially aesthetic dynamic of
racialization unfolding between blacks and whites.[39] Yet located between polarities
that have been understood to be fundamentally separate, the aesthetic would
simultaneously seem to be in a unique position to counteract the hierarchical and
differentiating functioning of the relevant dualities. This points to a contrary effect,
which, in various forms, has been witnessed by writers such as Julia Kristeva, Luce
Irigaray, Gloria Anzaldúa, and Audre Lorde, who recognize, in the aesthetic, resources
for critique and transformation.[40]
The taxicab scenario testifies to the recuperative workings of aesthetic syntheses and
oppositions. Rather than resisting power relations that tend to be associated with the
relevant Enlightenment dualities, in this case integrations assist in the production of
traditional racial hierarchies and differentiations, presumably because the integrative
work remains mainly in Bril’s hands.
This suggests the following proposal: contemporary aesthetic integrations and
dissociations are neither oppressive nor transformative in their own right, but achieve a
range of effects in collaboration with institutionalized histories of differentially
distributed aesthetic oppositions and integrations. In this view, aesthetic acts of
resistance to Enlightenment dualities can be assumed to go together with moments of
aesthetic reimplementation. Aesthetic forms participate in webs of normatively coded
dualities and integrations that are already in place in contingent cultural situations.
They interact with concrete constellations of aestheticized and aestheticizing power. A
theory of aesthetic disciplinarity must register what happens in these interactions. It
must take note of systemic and accidental forms of determination that converge in
concrete spaces and times. The above analysis of the taxicab case calls for a fine-

grained, detail-oriented approach to aesthetic disciplinarity that at the same time takes
cognizance of the force of broader, historical aesthetic structures.
My inquiry into the role of dualities and integrations in the taxi case bears out yet
another conclusion. The city, the encounter in the cab, the newspaper column, and the
reading of the column instantiate webs of experience. The resulting experiential textures
manifest various routes and directions of separation and integration. As the welldocumented faltering of the distinctions between the relevant Enlightenment poles
would suggest, there is no one-sided domination of one register of activity by another,
and neither are there generic conjunctions or divisions of elements. In fact, it is hard to
conceive what these options might amount to, given that the Enlightenment separations
ultimately break down and a far more messy, non-dualistic picture is in order on which
the mental amounts to the bodily, and dimensions of publicity and privacy and
individual and sociality intermesh with one another.
What the taxicab case demonstrates, then, are not the operations of a generalized
aesthetic integrationism within a fundamentally binary system, but a fabric of
experience in which specific, differentially available connections and disconnections
among mutually implicated registers of mind and body, individuality and sociality, and
privacy and publicity give rise to various forms of aesthetic positioning and power.
Within this experiential web, affect, sensation, and perception enable and constrain
what is being imagined and thought, and vice versa. Bril organizes modalities of mind,
sociality, and publicity to exert control in the realm of embodiment, individuality, and
privacy, but disciplinary racial effect also runs in the other direction: the writer is moved
to turn from the bodily impulses undergone within the constricted enclosure of the cab,
such as his experience of the music, to the wider reaches of the newspaper publication,
which articulates a sense of a racially divided community. In sum, aesthetic
disciplinarity takes complex, contingent forms that, even if they fail to confirm certain
integrationist generalizations, nonetheless draw on the dualities and integrations around
which aesthetic theorists have historically centered their conceptions of the aesthetic.
This historical dimension of current aesthetic agency is a part of a more extensive story
of aesthetic disciplinarity that remains to be told.[41]
7. Conclusion
Putting together the different parts of the analysis I have developed here, we can see
that a contemporary logic of racial community formation is capable of recruiting
historical, dualist and integrationist constructions of the aesthetic in the service of
aesthetic disciplinarity. Musical experience can thereby traverse a racializing trajectory.
Bril’s estrangement reflects a momentary turnabout of prefabricated cultural
borderlines, as a result of which an ordinarily excluded, unassimilable strangeness
flickers back at him. A slippage in the racial, national aesthetic allows the driver’s
designated alienation momentarily to convert into the passenger’s own strangeness.
However, the normative cultural subject knows his whereabouts among the standards
of taste, which have consolidated across the field of affect and perception, imagination
and reason. He masters the circuits of aesthetic abjection. Having disoriented cultural
being, aesthetic experience can also redirect lines of becoming. Fanning out between
the loops of individual judgment and the larger vistas of the public media, and scooping
up group anxieties through the aperture of private sensibility, aesthetic norms may get
us to repair the damage that is assumed to have been wreaked by undisciplined
otherness, in an attempt to quiet racial fear. Unsettled by aesthetic collisions, we can
reinstate cultural ownership through ready-made aesthetic scripts that press billowing
identifications back into their historically enforced racial and national troughs, which
have briefly displayed the tenuousness of their hold. Aesthetic disciplinarity appears to
be a powerful instrument of racial community building. Integrationism can advance the
project of a racial and nationalist aesthetic.
As my discussion of Bril and Addison indicates, the disciplinary operations of the
aesthetic implicate work. They prescribe a division of labor and enforce normative
valuations of kinds of work and workers. Recall that for Addison the aesthetic observer
need not work as hard as those who devote themselves to the toils of the mind but
nonetheless avoids the laziness of those who indulge in the life of the senses. Addison’s

comments on aesthetic contemplation appeared in his and Richard Steele’s daily
periodical, The Spectator. With this journal, he aimed to bring “Philosophy out of the
Closets and Libraries, Schools and Colleges, to dwell in Clubs and Assemblies, at Teatables and in Coffee-houses.”[42] Hitching onto the pleasures of urban leisure time
almost three centuries after the publication of Addison’s account of spectatorship, the
practice of aesthetic judgment, in itself a kind of labor performed for and by reading
newspapers and carried out in taxis, cafés, streets, trains, parks, and homes, excuses
Bril, the contemporary metropolitan commentator, from the arduous but not necessarily
less rewarding work of critical multiracial literacy, while conveying to the reader the
need for cultural regulation and ethnic assimilation in conformity with indigenous
cultural norms. Theorizing aesthetic disciplinarity involves attending to the labor the
aesthetic performs and demands, locally, nationally, and transnationally. It involves
exploring the ways in which particular types of work and escapes from work lock into
already given distributions of labor to aestheticize racial identities, boundaries, and
differences.[43]
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